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Abstract
Most ﬁnancial risk regulations assume that asset returns are ex-
ogenous, where risk is estimated by historical data. This assumption
fails to take into account the feedback eﬀect of trading decisions on
prices. We investigate this by means of simulations of a general equi-
librium model and compare the result to the case when risks regula-
tions are not present. Prices and liquidity are lower in the presence of
risk regulations, while volatility is higher. These eﬀects are especially
pronounced during crisis. Far from promoting stability, adoption of
risk regulations may have the perverse eﬀect of exacerbating ﬁnancial
instability.
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1 Introduction
The adoption of risk-management techniques by fund managers and other
market participants has proceeded at a rapid pace in recent years. Their
adoption has been driven not only by the market participants themselves in
reaction to their experiences of market turbulence, but also by a regulatory
climate that encourages putting so-called market sensitive risk management
systems at the operational center of ﬁnancial institutions. In particular,
the 1996 amendment of the Basel Accord on regulatory capital for market
risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996) has been especially
inﬂuential in this development.
The imposition of market sensitive regulatory capital stems from the pru-
dential objective of limiting the risk of failure of an individual institution by
providing an appropriate buﬀer against external shocks. In most instances,
the existence of such a buﬀer would be consistent with the self-interested
decisions of the ﬁnancial institution itself. However, the need for the impo-
sition of regulatory capital arises when the incentives of the individual market
participant point toward socially sub-optimal risk-taking due to agency prob-
lems within the organization. The case for regulatory capital is reinforced
by the consumer protection mandate of the regulator where the need is to
protect vulnerable uninformed stakeholders of the institution such as small
depositors of a bank.
However, there has been growing concern that the widespread adoption
of market sensitive risk management practices may have the unintended and
undesirable side-eﬀect of exacerbating short term price ﬂuctuations in ﬁnncial
markets. A typical statement of this concern is summarized in the following
passage1.
“So-called value-at-risk models (VAR) blend science and art. They
estimate how much a portfolio could lose in a single bad day. If
that amount gets too large, the VAR model signals that the bank
should sell. The trouble is that lots of banks have similar in-
vestments and similar VAR models. In periods when markets ev-
erywhere decline, the models can tell everybody to sell the same
things at the same time, making market conditions much worse.
In eﬀect, they can, and often do, create a vicious feedback loop.”
All risk-management systems in widespread use today rest on techniques
that attempt to infer the statistical relations governing asset returns by ref-
erence to actual, historical realizations of returns. Indeed, this is dictated
1The Economist Magazine, Oct 12th 2000.
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by the 1996 Basel amendment. By their nature, such risk-management sys-
tems treat the uncertainty governing asset returns as being exogenous. They
neglect the fact that the behavior of market participants is aﬀected by the
adoption of these techniques, creating a feedback eﬀect on the whole ﬁnancial
system. In short, these systems abstract from the system-wide consequences
of widespread adoption of these techniques. Blum (1999), Basak and Shapiro
(2001), Dan´ıelsson (2002), Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand (2001), Morris and Shin
(1999), Crockett (2000), and Persaud (2000) are some recent comments that
express unease about the current practice.
To their credit, many regulators have recognized the potentially desta-
bilizing eﬀects of market sensitive risk regulation. In the days following
the terrorist attack on New York and Washington on September 11th 2001,
ﬁnancial markets around the world were buﬀeted by unprecedented turbu-
lence. In response to the short term disruption to the smooth functioning of
markets, the authorities responded by suspending various solvency tests ap-
plied to large ﬁnancial institutions such as life insurance ﬁrms. In the U.K.,
for instance, the usual ‘resilience test’ applied to life insurance companies
in which the ﬁrm has to demonstrate solvency in the face of a further 25%
market decline was suspended for several weeks. More recently, following
the renewed declined in stocks markets in the summer of 2002, the Financial
Services Authority - the U.K. regulator - has diluted the resilience test so
as to pre-empt the destabilizing forced sales of stocks by the major market
players2.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the overall framework for risk regu-
lation relies on a prudential perspective that views each ﬁnancial institution
on its own. The framework tends to neglect the system-wide perspective.
Hence, the blindspot in conventional risk management techniques, and espe-
cially the supervisory approach to the regulation of risk, is the presumption
that risk management is a single-person decision problem i.e. a game against
nature. That is, uncertainty governing price movements is assumed to be
exogenous, and assumed not to depend on the actions of other decision mak-
ers. The analogy is with a meteorologist trying to predict the weather. The
weather is unaﬀected by the predictions issued by weather forecasters and
the consequent actions that these forecasts generate. Financial markets are
diﬀerent. When short run price changes are inﬂuenced by the trading deci-
sions of market participants (as surely they must), then shifts in the beliefs
of market participants will lead to actions that precipitate certain outcomes.
There is, in other words, a feedback eﬀect from the beliefs of market partici-
2Financial Times, Weekend Money, June 28th 2002, “Insolvency rules are eased for
life oﬃces” by Jason Corcoran.
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pants to the actual outcome in the market. Indeed, there are strong reasons
to believe that this feedback eﬀect will reinforce any exogenous pressures on
prices arising from the fundamentals.
A gambling analogy is instructive. If the underlying uncertainty facing a
trader were exogenous, modelling risk is akin to a gambler facing a spin of
a roulette wheel, where the bets placed by him and other gamblers do not
aﬀect the outcome of the spin. However, when the outcome depends on the
actions of other traders, risk modelling resembles poker more than roulette.
Current risk management practices rest on the roulette view of uncertainty.
The roulette wheel may have an unknown number of outcomes with diﬀering
probabilities, but as long as the outcome is unaﬀected by the actions of other
gamblers, it is simply a matter of applying standard statistical techniques to
past outcomes to enumerate what these outcomes are, and to estimate their
respective probabilities. Much of the sophisticated techniques in the current
state of the art can be seen as alternative ways of reﬁning such estimation
procedures, as well as tracking the non–linear payoﬀ structures arising from
derivative securities. To the extent that the stochastic process governing
asset prices depends on what traders do, this view of the world is invalid.
The uncertainty facing traders is endogenous, and depends on the actions of
market participants.
In what follows, we investigate the consequences of the widespread adop-
tion of market-sensitive risk management systems that treat ﬁnancial market
uncertainty as exogenous, and do not take into account the feedback from
traders’ actions to the market outcomes. We gauge their systemic impact
by comparing the dynamics of asset prices with risk–management systems
and compare this with asset price dynamics in the absence of such systems.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we will give a non-
technical overview of our model and summarize some of our main simulation
results. Section 3 presents the model in more detail, and Section 4 describes
our simulations in more detail.
The original objective of introducing market sensitive regulatory rules of
course remains valid even if our arguments are taken on board. Our ar-
guments do not address the agency problems in ﬁnancial institutions and
the associated incentive issues. Nor have we addressed the consumer pro-
tection mandate of the regulator. The costs of risk regulation must be set
against the beneﬁts. Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to a fully
informed debate on the issue by highlighting the endogenous nature of risk
when market participants are faced with regulatory constraints.
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2 Overview of Model and Simulation Results
Our model is based on a standard asset pricing model where a large num-
ber of small traders each have constant absolute risk aversion, but where
the degree of risk aversion varies across traders. The underlying uncertainty
is driven by the cashﬂow process which is assumed to be conditionally nor-
mal. The model builds on the single period model by Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand
(2001) in which a Value–at–Risk (VaR) constraint is introduced that restricts
the portfolio choices of traders. Speciﬁcally, traders forecast next period’s
risk, and this estimate restricts their portfolio selection. A similar model
has been proposed by Basak and Shapiro (2001). Crucially, traders follow
current practices in risk management and forecast risk by means of a stan-
dard variance–covariance (VCV) technique. In other words, traders use a
backward–looking belief revision process in which forecasts are generated by
reference to past realizations of returns, as recommended by many of the
current risk management systems and required by regulators.
When the VaR constraint binds, we show that it has an eﬀect similar to
an increase in the underlying risk aversion of the traders. Since the degree
to which this constraint binds is determined by market outcomes, the net
eﬀect of the VaR constraint is that the traders behave as if their degree of
risk aversion is ﬂuctuating with the market outcomes. In particular, since
the VaR constraint binds mostly during periods of market turbulence, the
increased eﬀective risk aversion leads to sales of risky assets, and serves to
exacerbate market volatility and to reduce liquidity. This is indeed one way in
which we can understand the frequently heard statement from market pundits
during distressed episodes that the “level of risk aversion has gone up.” Such
statements are normally frowned upon by conventional economists, since risk
aversion is part of the make–up of the individual trader (much like the color of
his eyes), and are part of the basic parameters of the economy. However, our
interpretation suggests that even if the underlying basic preferences remain
constant over time, the actions of the traders are determined by a rule which
is identical to the actions of someone whose risk aversion is ﬂuctuating over
time.
The dynamics of the model are generated by the sequence of events in
which the risk-constrained traders have a set of beliefs based upon which they
form their net asset demands. Market-clearing then generates equilibrium
prices. The assets yield exogenous random payoﬀs which in turn determine
realized returns for risky assets. Completing the cycle, the traders use this
realization to update their beliefs and the economy advances by one period.
The following diagram illustrates the sequence of events that generate the
dynamics in our model.
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We can implement our model once we specify the exogenous stochastic
process that generates the payoﬀs of the assets at the beginning of each
date. We use standard linear normal models to generate this exogenous
uncertainty, incorporating volatility clustering (GARCH) eﬀects, calibrated
to stylized facts about ﬁnancial data. Our simulations reveal the following
eﬀects of the widespread adoption of VaR constraints.
• Prices (for positive–beta assets) are lower with VaR constraints than
without. The magnitudes can sometimes be very substantial.
• Following a negative shock to asset prices, the troughs in the price
paths are deeper, last longer, and take a longer time to recover when
there are VaR constraints.
• The forecast variance of returns is, in general, larger with VaR con-
straints than without. The diﬀerence in the forecast variance as be-
tween the constrained and unconstrained economy is largest during
distressed episodes in the market.
From our simulations, it seems that the widespread adoption of backward–
looking risk management practices, such as standard VCV methods, may
have a detrimental eﬀect on asset price volatility and market distress. Far
from having a dampening eﬀect on price volatility, it may have the perverse
eﬀect of exacerbating it.
3 Model
We now give a more complete description of our model, and describe how
a VaR constraint aﬀects traders’ actions. Time is discrete, and indexed by
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }. In each period, there are three traded assets, labeled as
assets 0, 1 and 2. Asset 0 is the risk-free asset, while assets 1 and 2 are
risky. Without loss of generality we assume there is a ﬁxed, deterministic
time-invariant supply of θi units of the i
th risky asset. We denote by qit the
price of the ith asset at time t. Any asset traded at time t − 1 matures at
date t, and yields payoﬀ dit. The gross return on asset i between periods t
and t + 1 is denoted by Ri,t+1, and deﬁned as
Ri,t+1 ≡ di,t+1
qit
Denote by Rt the vector of returns over risky assets, so that
Rt ≡
(
R1t
R2t
)
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The traders in our model have short horizons, in the sense that they
choose their portfolio to maximize expected utility in the next period. The
short horizon assumption tries to capture the incentives that fund managers
face in which considerable emphasis is placed on short–term assessments
of their performance, or internal controls on their discretion such as ‘daily
earnings at risk’ (DEAR) limits.
To further facilitate the analysis, we reduce the dynamic portfolio choice
problem to a sequence of one–period choice problems by assuming that the
assets in the economy mature after one period, and traders must roll over
their holding in each period. If we denote by xht the number of units of the
safe asset held by trader h between periods t and t+1 and by yhit the number
of units of the risky asset i held by trader h between periods t and t+1, then
the wealth in period t + 1 for trader h is given by
W ht+1 ≡ xht d0,t+1 +
∑
i
yhitdi,t+1
At date t, trader h aims to maximize the expected value of his von Neumann
Morgenstern utility
u
(
W ht+1
)
The traders are also assumed to have constant absolute risk aversion, so that
the asset demands are independent of wealth, and prices depend only on the
aggregate endowments, rather than the distribution of endowments across
traders. In particular, we suppose that there is a continuum of small traders
and denote by αh the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of trader h. The
population of traders is such that αh is distributed uniformly on the interval
[, 1] where  > 0. This last assumption ensures that there are no risk-neutral
traders in our model.
Since prices are independent of the distribution of wealth across traders in
such a model, we can simplify the notation without aﬀecting the equilibrium
prices by assuming that the new supply of the risky assets at each period
is owned by individuals other than the traders themselves. Moreover, we
suppose that the aggregate endowments of the risky assets are constant over
time. Denote by
θ ≡
(
θ1
θ2
)
the vector of time-invariant aggregate supplies of the risky assets.
This model is a multiperiod extension of the Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand
(2001) model. Their model analyzes the general equilibrium implications
of VaR constraints with emphasis on a formal analysis of the single period
problem. Here, we extend the analysis to a multi–period learning framework
by means of simulations
7
3.1 Belief Revision Process
A key feature of our approach is the modelling of the beliefs of the traders. In
order to replicate the eﬀect of risk–management systems that rely on realized
historical returns, we investigate the eﬀects of a backward–looking belief
revision mechanism for traders. We assume that the traders update their
beliefs through standard VCV tools for forecasting covariance matrices, in
particular, RiskMetricsTM. Furthermore we assume the traders use a similar
forecasting rule for returns. Although it would be straightforward to model
updating of beliefs with more sophisticated techniques, such as having the
traders optimize a GARCH-type model each period, we believe that this
would not add to our results in any signiﬁcant way.
The traders’ beliefs on returns are conditionally jointly normal, and we
denote by (µt,Σt) the traders’ beliefs concerning the expected returns µt
and covariances of returns Σt of the risky assets between dates t and t + 1.
Thus,
µt =
(
µ1t
µ2t
)
Σt =
(
σ11t σ
12
t
σ12t σ
22
t
)
where σijt is the covariance of Ri,t+1 and Rj,t+1.
The traders adjust their beliefs concerning the expected returns and co-
variances by taking a geometric weighted average of past realizations, where
the decay factor ρ = 0.97 follows the RiskMetricsTM (1999) recommenda-
tions. The backward–looking belief revision mechanism can be formalized in
terms of the recursive updating rule given by the mapping
((µt,Σt) ,Rt+1) →
(
µt+1,Σt+1
)
where
σijt+1 = ρσ
ij
t + (1− ρ)(Rit − µit)(Rjt − µjt) (1)
for constant ρ ∈ (0, 1), and likewise for µt+1, so that
µt+1 = ρµt + (1− ρ)Rt (2)
The dynamics of our model are generated in the following fashion. The
economy begins with an initial set of beliefs for the traders, given by (µ0,Σ0).
Based on these beliefs, traders make their portfolio choices. If traders are
constrained by a VaR constraint, their portfolio choices will be aﬀected (we
will examine the optimal portfolio rules in more detail below). Given the
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portfolio choices, the aggregate demand functions can be deﬁned. Together
with the aggregate endowments θ, we can derive the prices of the assets.
Then, the realizations of payoﬀs {d1} determine the returns R1 for the risky
assets, and the traders update their beliefs according to (1) and (2). This is
repeated until the simulation ends at t = T .
Beliefs (µt,Σt)
Demand yht
Prices qt Payoﬀs realized dt+1
Returns Rt+1
A
d
va
n
ce
on
e
p
er
io
d
In order to implement our model, we need to solve for the optimal port-
folio decisions of the traders, and specify the stochastic process generating
the payoﬀs. We tackle each in turn.
3.2 The Value–at–Risk Constraint
We ﬁrst solve the portfolio choice problem of the traders, in which they face
a possible constraint on the probability of a loss beyond some ﬁxed size. We
examine the constraint of the form
Probt
[
Et
(
W ht+1
)−W ht+1 ≥ VaR] ≤ p¯ (3)
where VaR is the permitted value-at-risk, and p¯ is the permitted probability
with which the VaR limit can be breached. Given the conditional normality
of beliefs, we can express this constraint in simple terms. Denoting by Φ (·)
the distribution function of the standard normal, note that (3) holds if and
only if
Φ
(−VaR
σW,t+1
)
≤ p¯
where σW,t+1 is the standard deviation of W
h
t+1 with respect to the beliefs at
date t. Equivalently, this condition can be written as
σ2W,t+1 ≤
(
VaR
Φ−1 (1− p¯)
)2
≡ v¯ (4)
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Thus, the VaR constraint boils down to a constraint on the maximal permit-
ted variance of W ht+1. The right hand side of (4) is a constant determined by
the parameters of the problem, and we will denote it by v¯.
It is useful to consider the forecast distribution of payoﬀs in addition to
those for returns. The forecast distribution follows from the updating process
(1). Denote by
(mt,St)
the forecast mean and covariance of payoﬀs, and denote by
sijt
the (i, j)th entry of St. Thus, s
ij
t is the traders’ belief of the covariance
between di,t+1 and dj,t+1.
We can then incorporate the VaR constraint formally into a trader’s port-
folio choice problem. Denoting by Et (·) the expectations operator with re-
spect to beliefs at date t, trader h’s optimization problem at date t is to
maximize
Et
(
uh
(
W ht+1
))
by choosing portfolio holdings xht , y
h
1t, y
h
2t, subject to
q0txt +
∑
i
qity
h
it ≤ d0txt−1 +
∑
i
dity
h
i,t−1
∑
i
∑
j
sijt y
h
ity
h
jt ≤ v¯
The ﬁrst constraint is the period t budget constraint of trader h. The right
hand side of the constraint is the available wealth resulting from last period’s
investment, while the left hand side is the value of the portfolio purchased at
time t. The second constraint is the VaR constraint, which can be expressed
more succinctly as
yh
′
t Sty
h
t ≤ v¯
The ﬁrst–order condition for the optimal portfolio can then be written as:
Et
[
uh
′ (
W ht+1
)
(dt+1 − d0,t+1qt)
]
= 2λht Sty
h
t
where λht is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the VaR constraint for
trader h at date t. Denote by φht the normalized Lagrange multiplier for the
VaR constraint, given by.
φht ≡
2λht
Et [uh
′ ]
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Then, the ﬁrst order condition can be re-arranged to yield the demand func-
tions:
yht =
1
αh + φht
S−1t (mt − d0,t+1qt)
Were it not for the φht term in the denominator, these demand functions are
the familiar textbook ones for traders with constant absolute risk aversion.
The VaR constraint enters into the problem by raising the eﬀective risk aver-
sion for the trader from αh to αh + φht . In other words, the introduction of
the VaR constraint acts in the same way as a ﬂuctuating risk aversion level
of the trader.
By setting aggregate demand equal to the supplies θ, we can solve for the
equilibrium prices at date t.
qt =
1
d0,t+1
(mt −ΨtStθ) (5)
where
Ψt ≡ 1∫ 1

1
αh+φht
dh
Ψt can be given an interpretation in terms of the average “eﬀective risk
aversion” across all traders at date t. It is proportional to the harmonic
mean of the individual eﬀective risk aversion coeﬃcients αh + φht .
The expression for equilibrium prices in (5) suggests that we can make
some sense of the frequently heard statement during distressed episodes for
the market that the “level of risk aversion has gone up.” Our expression
for equilibrium prices suggest that even if the basic risk aversion is constant
(given by αh), the trader acts “as if” his risk aversion was ﬂuctuating over
time. It is in this sense that we can regard Ψt as the average eﬀective risk
aversion of the traders.
The implementation of our model entails solving for the time series of
{Ψt}. There are a number of subtleties in solving for Ψt, since the Lagrange
multipliers λht depend on the contemporaneous prices, and hence the solu-
tion of Ψt involves solving a ﬁxed point problem. The reader is referred to
Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand (2001) for the detailed solution method, and for the
conditions for the existence of equilibrium. However, the solution for Ψt can
be given a relatively clean explicit characterization.
In order to state the solution for Ψt explicitly, ﬁrst consider the function
zez. This is a non-monotonic function that has a minimum at z = −1. For
z < −1, it is a decreasing function for z, while when z > −1, it is an increas-
ing function of z. Consider the restriction of this function to the interval
(−∞,−1]. The inverse of this restricted function is deﬁned for the interval
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[−e−1, 0), and takes values in (−∞,−1]. This partial function is sometimes
referred to as the non-principal branch of the Lambert correspondence. We
denote this partial function as F (·). Then, the explicit solution for Ψt can
be stated as follows (see Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand, 2001)
Ψt =


1
ln −1
if 0 ≤ κt ≤  ln −1
κt − 
κtF
(− (κt + ) e−1) if  ln −1 ≤ κt ≤ 1− 
where
κt ≡
√
θ′Stθ
v¯
An equilibrium fails to exist when κt > 1−. The intuition for this lies in the
interpretation of κt. The numerator is the total risk in the economy that must
be borne by the traders as a whole, while the denominator is the maximum
allowable risk. The total measure of traders is 1− , and equilibrium fails to
exist when the per capita risk in the economy is too large for the traders to
take on.
4 Simulations
We now come to the core of our paper, where we report the simulation
results of our model. Having solved for the equilibrium prices, the latent
data generation process (DGP) for the payoﬀs remains to be speciﬁed. The
backward–looking updating rule used by the traders in our model means that
the perceived DGP believed by the traders is diﬀerent from the latent DGP.
In particular, the fact that the distribution of the return process is latent and
has to be forecast by a variance–covariance (VCV) method mirrors practice
in the actual market.
For our simulations, we chose a latent DGP for payoﬀs that conformed
to some of the stylized facts of ﬁnancial returns. In order to take account of
features such as volatility clustering, unconditional non–normality, and the
relative size diﬀerence between returns and volatility, we speciﬁed a GARCH
process, where the actual parameter values were chosen by calibration to ﬁt
some reasonable summary statistics. Thus, in the results we report below,
the true payoﬀs are conditionally normal and unconditionally non–normal,
and allow for volatility clustering. To ensure that our simulations were not
aﬀected by the initial conditions, we allowed the economy to adjust for 500
periods in the simulations before we start to record the data. Thus, date 0
in our reported results is date 501 of the actual simulation
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4.1 Parameter Values
The following parameter values for our model were used in the simulations,
where mˆ is the mean of the latent payoﬀ process, and Sˆ is the unconditional
covariance matrix of the latent payoﬀ process.
endowments θ =
(
1.9
0.5
)
daily risk free rate r0 = 1.00013
decay factor ρ = 0.97
lowest risk aversion  = 0.0011
unconditional latent payoﬀ distribution Sˆ =
(
0.6 0.25
0.25 0.4
)
mˆ =
(
1.5
1.2
)
The main results are presented in a series of ﬁgures. We ﬁrst show the
result of the typical run, and then we examine the impact of an exogenous
shock to the latent payoﬀ process that is the equivalent of a large shock that
may be expected once in ten years. Finally, we will report how we can track
changes in the eﬀective risk aversion, prices and volatility, perceived as well
as actual. All ﬁgures are presented at the end of the paper.
4.2 Analysis of a Run
Given the sample economy, we set the risk constraint v¯ = 100. The price
evolution of the price of asset 1 is shown in Figure 1. The upper panel
tracks the price of asset 1 over time, where we have also superimposed the
price path of the unregulated economy (where the VaR constraint does not
bind). As we would expect for a positive beta asset, the price path of the
regulated economy is below the price path of the unregulated economy. This
is a natural consequence of the fact that the VaR constraint enters as an
increment to the eﬀective risk aversion of the traders. Increased eﬀective risk
aversion implies that prices are lower. The lower panel shows the ratio of
the unregulated price to regulated price. Note that the price diﬀerences can
very substantial, ranging from zero to 40%.
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Figure 2 tracks elements of the traders’ forecast covariance matrix of
returns, Σt. The upper panel reports the forecast variance for the return of
asset 1. Note how the imposition of the VaR constraint raises the forecast
variance. The lower panel shows this more explicitly by reporting the ratio
of the unregulated variance to regulated variance for asset 1. Again, as with
prices, the diﬀerences can be rather substantial.
4.3 A Shock
We now examine the impact of a large exogenous one day shock to the payoﬀ
realization of asset 1. The magnitude of the shock equals the expected worst
daily outcome in 10 years, i.e., the expected minimum of 2,500 realizations.
This amount is −5.3. In order to accurately gauge the impact, we repeated
the exercise 106 times and present the averages. The VaR constraint was set
as v¯ = 1000.
The eﬀect of the shock is rather dramatic, as can be seen in Figure 3.
There is a steep fall in the price after the shock, followed by a slow recovery.
In particular, for the ﬁrst few days after the shock the crisis deepens through
the endogenous feedback in prices. Note, however, how the price path in
the regulated economy follows a steeper decline and reaches a lower trough.
The trough is deeper, and lasts longer in the regulated economy than in the
unregulated one. The recovery of the price also takes longer. The bottom
panel shows the ratio of prices across the two economies. The price ratio
follows a rather interesting double-humped shape, in which the maximum
diﬀerence in the prices follow rather late after the shock. At its maximum,
the price ratio is almost 20%.
Figure 4 plots the corresponding changes in the perceived volatilities in
the economy in terms of the determinants of the forecast covariance matrices
{St}. The regulated economy with the VaR constraint has substantially
higher values of |St|, thereby inducing the traders to take more conservative
trading decisions, and exacerbating the dynamics further. The center panel
plots the ratio of the determinants across the two economies. The bottom
panel tracks the evolution over time of the average eﬀective risk–aversion, Ψt
as well as the steady–state eﬀective risk–aversion, i.e. without the shock.
4.4 Tracking Eﬀective Risk Aversion
One of the advantages of having an explicit model for the portfolio decisions
of the traders is that it allows us to track the eﬀect of a tighter VaR constraint
through the economy. There are two ways of doing this. The ﬁrst is through
changes in the average eﬀective risk aversion Ψt. Figures 3 and 4 plot the
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Ψt realizations over time following a shock. The second way to show the
eﬀect of tighter VaR constraints is through the eﬀects on prices and forecast
variances. In ﬁgure 5, we illustrate the impact of the severity of the VaR
constraint on prices and perceived volatilities.
The solid line is the ratio of the average prices (q1+q2)/2 averaged across
time. We can see that as v¯ becomes smaller (so that the VaR constraint
binds more tightly), the prices in the regulated economy fall further. We have
already commented on the fact that when v¯ becomes too small, equilibrium
fails to exist in our model. For the parameters chosen in our simulations,
this point is reached when v¯ hits 12. To the left of this point, equilibrium
does not exist. At the opposite extreme, we can see that as v¯ → ∞, the
constrained and unconstrained economies converge.
Also depicted in ﬁgure 5 is the ratio of determinants for the regulated
and unregulated economies, as a function of v¯. As we would expect, the
diﬀerences in forecast volatility becomes very large when v¯ is small. As
v¯ →∞, the diﬀerence disappears.
In ﬁgure 6, we plot an investor’s eﬀective risk aversion αh + φht as a
function of both the VaR constraint log v¯ but also of the population risk-
aversion parameter αh (recall that the population αh is distributed uniformly
on the interval [, 1]). The kink in the surface marks the boundary where the
VaR constraint “kicks in” (i.e. starts to bind). When a trader has a high
value of αh, then the VaR constraint does not bind, and hence does not aﬀect
the economy.
5 Conclusions
The issues examined in our paper are eerily reminiscent of the debate in the
1970s arising from the Lucas Critique, (see Lucas, 1976) . The main lesson
drawn by macroeconomic forecasters then was that one should distinguish
between reduced form regularities (which are liable to break down when be-
havior changes) from genuinely structural relations of the economy. The fail-
ure to distinguish properly between the two lead to unjustiﬁable conclusions
concerning the consequences of policy. This point is succinctly summarized
in Goodhart’s Law :
“Any statistical relationship will break down when used for policy
purposes” (Goodhart, 1974)
To canny traders, this is a rather obvious and banal point, and the ﬁxed
income and FX pages of the press and news services abound with references
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to strategic trading terms such as overhangs of leveraged positions, short–
covering and the like. So, it is clear that traders recognize the endogenous
nature of market risk, even if their risk management systems do not. The
neglect of the endogenous nature of risk in risk management models is all
the more puzzling when set against the lessons drawn after the October
1987 crash of the stock market. The Brady Commission (1988) attributed
the magnitude and swiftness of the price decline to practices such as port-
folio insurance and dynamic hedging techniques. Such trading techniques
have the property that they dictate selling an asset when its price falls and
buying it when the price rises. Best estimates at the time suggested that
around $100 billion in funds were following formal portfolio insurance pro-
grams, representing around 3% of the pre–crash market value. However, this
is almost certainly an underestimate of total selling pressure arising from in-
formal hedging techniques such as stop–loss orders, see the survey evidence
presented in Shiller (1987). Portfolio insurance has been discussed e.g. by
Grossman and Vila (1989), Gennotte and Leland (1990), Basak and Shapiro
(1995), and Grossman and Zhou (1996). The events of the summer and
autumn of 1998 in which ﬁnancial markets experienced severe disruptions
to liquidity and risk appetite can only be satisfactorily understood if the
endogeneity of ﬁnancial risk is taken into account.
The exercise in this paper has uncovered some unsettling side-eﬀects
of imposing value–at–risk constraints in an economy where traders follow
backward–looking belief revision rules. Far from stabilizing prices, the eﬀect
of such constraints is to induce behavior that exacerbates the shocks further.
Of course, the rationale for regulatory capital remains valid even if our ar-
guments are taken on board. Our simulations do not consider the agency
problems in ﬁnancial institutions and the associated incentive issues. Nor
have we addressed the consumer protection mandate of the regulator. The
overall case for risk regulation must be based on a cost-beneﬁt analysis in
which the limitations to risk-taking behavior is set against the possible dam-
age done by the endogenously generated risk that arises from risk regulation.
Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to a fully informed debate on the
issue by highlighting the endogenous nature of risk when market participants
are faced with regulatory constraints.
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Figure 1: Impact on Prices
400 realizations of the prices of asset one in the sample economy with risk constraint
v¯ = 100. The bottom panel shows the ratio of the regulated to unregulated prices. Note
it is always greater than one, indicating that the regulated economy has lower prices.
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Figure 2: Impact on Forecast Return Variance
400 realizations of the forecast volatility of asset one in the sample economy with risk
constraint v¯ = 100. The bottom panel shows the ratio of the regulated to unregulated
volatilities. Note it is always less than one, indicating that the regulated economy had
higher forecast volatility.
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Figure 3: 10 Year Shock to Payoﬀs: Price Impact
The result of a single period shock equaling the expected largest 10 year (2500 obs.)
adverse shock to payoﬀs of asset one. Economy starts in steady state, and the exercise
is repeated 106 times. The lower ﬁgure shows the ratio of the regulated to unregulated
prices. Note that the shock impact is larger, and the adjustment to steady state takes
longer in the regulated economy. The bottom panel shows Ψt.
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Figure 4: 10 Year Shock to Payoﬀs: Forecast Volatility Impact
The result of a single period shock equaling the expected largest 10 year (2500 obs.)
adverse shock on payoﬀs on the determinant of the forecast covariance matrix. Economy
starts in steady state, and the exercise is repeated 106 times. The middle panel shows
the ratio of the determinants of unregulated covariance matrix to the regulated covariance
matrix. The shock impact is larger, and the adjustment to steady state takes longer in
the regulated economy. The bottom panel shows Ψt.
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Figure 5: Increasingly Restrictive Risk Constraint
Impact on the sample economy of adjusting the risk constraint, log(v¯). At values log(v¯) <
12 equilibrium is no longer deﬁned, and at log(v¯) =∞ the constraint is no longer binding.
The ﬁgure shows the ratio of the unregulated average prices to the unregulated prices, and
the same ratio for the perceived covariance matrix. Note how as log(v¯) → ∞, the ratios
tend to one.
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Figure 6: Eﬀective Risk Aversion
Impact on eﬀective risk aversion, (αh+φht ), of adjusting risk constraint, log(v¯), for traders
with varying risk aversion, (αh).
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